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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this case under Utah Code Ann. §
78-2a-3(2)Q).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
In addition to the issues presented by Appellants Comtrol, Inc. ("Comtrol") and
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. ("USF&G"),1 there are three issues presented on
cross-appeal:
I.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by estopping SFR, Inc. d/b/a QED

("QED") from claiming $34,259.43 against USF&G's payment bond when QED's
endorsed a joint check issued by Comtrol for $85,383.19 to subcontractor Atlas Electric,
Inc. ("Atlas") but collected only $51,123.76 of the joint check proceeds because QED
was not contractually entitled to collect the remaining $34,259.43 at the time the joint
check was issued?
A trial court's imposition of equitable estoppel is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. See Dep't of Human Servs. ex rel. Parker v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 680 (Utah
1997).
This issue was preserved in QED's memoranda and oral argument regarding a
motion in limine. (R. 771-73, 854-61, 1084-1101, 2224:7-12.)

1

Comtrol and USF&G are referred to individually regarding actions that they
individually took. With respect to actions that Comtrol and USF&G took jointly,
including their conduct of the litigation in the trial court and their briefing on appeal, this
brief refers to Comtrol and USF&G jointly as "USF&G."

1

II.

If the trial court abused its discretion by estopping QED from claiming

$34,259.43 against the payment bond, did it also commit legal error by awarding QED
less than all of its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs?
A trial court's calculation of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs is reviewed for
abuse of discretion, and its decision to award the fees and costs it deems reasonable is
reviewed de novo. See Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1988).
This issue was preserved in QED's motion and memorandum for attorneys' fees.
(R. 1424-38.)
III.

Did the trial court erroneously apply the statutory post-judgment interest

rate of 6.37% to the attorneys' fees and costs portion of the Amended Judgment despite
the fact that QED was entitled to a contractual interest rate of 18% on unpaid funds
pursuant to its agreement with Atlas, and the payment bond statute entitles QED to
recover against the payment bond "for any unpaid amount due [it]"?
A trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness. See Spears v.
Warr, 2002 UT 24, % 12, 44 P.3d 742.
This issue was preserved in QED's Response to Defendants' Reply Memorandum
in Support of Objection to Proposed Judgment. (R. 1732-36.)
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. §§ 15-1-1 to -4.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-504(4).
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-208.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves a dispute between QED, a materials supplier, and USF&G, a

surety that issued a payment bond in connection with the Matheson Junior High School
project in Magna, Utah (the "Project"). QED furnished electrical materials to Atlas in
connection with Atlas's subcontract with Comtrol, the general contractor on the Project.
Comtrol purchased a payment bond (the "Bond") from USF&G for the benefit of those
furnishing labor and materials on the Project. QED was not paid for all the materials it
furnished for the Project and, as a result, filed a claim against the Bond. QED
commenced this action to collect against the Bond.
II.

COURSE AND DISPOSITION OF PROCEEDINGS
This case was tried in the trial court on December 19 through December 22, 2005.

(R. 2220-2223.) The trial court issued preliminary findings of fact and conclusions of
law from the bench on January 23, 2006. (R. 2225:21.). A true and correct copy of the
transcript of the trial court's decision is included in the concurrently-filed Addenda (the
"Addenda") as Addendum A. On March 16, 2006, the Court issued an Order awarding
QED its attorneys' fees and costs, but it later reduced QED's attorneys' fees and costs
award by 25%. (R. 1570-75.) The trial court entered judgment in favor of QED on June
13, 2006. (R. 1761-64.) On June 23, 2006, QED filed a motion pursuant to Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(a) to amend the judgment, (R. 1776-1836), which the
trial court addressed in a minute entry and order dated August 31, 2006 (R. 2074-77.) A

3

true and correct copy of the August 31, 2006, minute entry is included in the Addenda as
Addendum B. The Amended Revised Findings and Amended Judgment were filed on
October 2, 2006, and entered against Comtrol and USF&G on October 3, 2006. (R.
2124-44.) A true and correct copy of the Amended Revised Findings is included in the
Addenda as Addendum C; a true and correct copy of the Amended Judgment is included
in the Addenda as Addendum D Comtrol and USF&G filed a notice of appeal on
October 6, 2006. (R. 2152-54.) QED filed a notice of cross-appeal on October 19, 2006.
(R. 2171-72.)
III.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 2001, Comtrol subcontracted electrical work on the Project to Atlas. (PA-2,2

COMPT3011-3016; PA-3, COMPT0990-0994.) USF&G issued the Bond, which
guaranteed payment for all materials furnished to the Project. (PA-1.) A true and correct
copy of the Bond is included in the Addenda as Addendum E.
Atlas purchased its electrical materials for the Project from QED pursuant to the
terms of Atlas's open account with QED. (R. 2220:27, 32; R. 2221:329, 351-52 and
419-20; R. 2223:679.) The terms of Atlas's account with QED required Atlas to pay for
the product it received on or before the last day of the month following the month in
which it received the product. (PA-6, QED 0001-0059; PA-4, QED 0060-0061; R.
2221:316-317.) QED substantiated these terms at trial with several types of evidence,

The trial court's exhibits were denoted by a designation of "PA" for "Plaintiff and
"DA" for "Defendants" and an exhibit number. For consistency purposes, the trial
exhibits are referred to as they were at trial, i.e., "PA-1," for Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 1.
4

including the invoices associated with the Project; testimony from QED personnel and
Alan Hall ("Hall"), Atlas's project manager; and the terms of the credit agreement
executed by Atlas. (PA-4; PA-6; R. 2221:446-47.) A true and correct copy of the credit
agreement is included in the Addenda as Addendum F. The credit agreement also
required Atlas to pay 18% annually on all past due amounts and to reimburse QED for all
attorneys' fees and costs incurred by QED in collecting past due amounts. (PA-4, QED
0001 A.)
Atlas failed to fully pay QED for the materials QED furnished for the Project. The
unpaid principal balance on Atlas's account with QED for the Project was $143,189.14.
(R. 2220:69.) QED subsequently perfected a bond claim by providing the preliminary
notices required by Utah law and by issuing certified letters to Comtrol, USF&G, the
Project owner and Atlas. (PA-1.)
During the course of discovery, each party issued one set of interrogatories and
requests for production of documents. (R. 1-9.) QED deposed one witness. USF&G did
not take a single deposition., nor did it pursue any motions to compel.
In late November 2005, QED discovered additional documents in its warehouse
(the "Remittance Documents") and promptly produced them in its pretrial disclosures.

USF&G refers to these documents in its brief as the "11 Hour documents" and argues
that QED produced them on the "eve of trial." Such references are misleading. QED
produced those documents on November 21, 2005, exactly 29 days prior to trial. QED
will therefore refer to these documents as the "Remittance Documents." It is not clear
whether or not the Remittance Documents were produced or made available for
inspection to counsel or the parties during the discovery process. Furthermore, USF&G's
decision to not take even so much as a single deposition, let alone depose QED personnel
5

(R. 526-604.) On December 2, 2005, USF&G filed a Motion for Sanctions or, in the
Alternative, a Motion in Limine (the "Motion for Sanctions") wherein USF&G requested
sanctions in the form of dismissal of QED's claims or, in the alternative, an order
preventing QED from using the Remittance Documents at trial. (R. 627-45.) Nor did
USF&G seek a continuance of the trial, (id.), nor did it request the opportunity to conduct
further discovery regarding the Remittance Documents. USF&G also failed to compel
the disclosure of any other documents 4 (Id.)
QED responded to the Motion for Sanctions with affidavits explaining the
circumstances surrounding discovery of the Remittance Documents. (R. 1311-25.) On
Friday, December 16, 2005, just three days prior to trial, the trial court held a hearing on
all outstanding motions, including the Motion for Sanctions. (R. 2224.) In that hearing,
QED explained the timing of the production of the Remittance Documents and further
indicated that the Remittance Documents were supportive of QED's claims. (R.
2224:23-25.) The trial court granted USF&G's Motion for Sanctions by issuing an order
preventing QED from relying on the Remittance Documents at trial. (R. 1390.)
Prior to trial, QED stipulated to reduce its claims for the value of various materials
and supplies it furnished to Atlas for the Project. (R. 2127 ^f 15.) These "Stipulated

regarding documents, business procedures and retention policies, left USF&G with the
inability, then and now, to provide evidence that the documents were intentionally
withheld and/or that additional documents responsive to USF&G's discovery requests
existed but were never produced.
4
USF&G also filed a "Motion In Limine of Defendants Comtrol, Inc. and USF&G to
Exclude Ship Tickets." The ship tickets were produced by QED seven days prior to trial
and as soon as they were located. USF&G requested that QED be barred from using the
6

Deductions" reduced QED's principal damages claim at trial to $137,311.49. (Id.) The
trial court received all of QED's unpaid invoices (the "Unpaid Invoices") into evidence.
(PA-6, QED 0001-0059.) A sample Unpaid Invoice is included in the Addenda as
Addendum G. Each of the Unpaid Invoices included language at the bottom that
indicated when the invoice was due and payable. (PA-6, QED 0001-0059.) These dates
corresponded with testimony at trial that an invoice became due following the last day of
the month following the month in which the invoice was issued. (R. 2221:316-317.)
The trial court also admitted all other invoices and credit memos issued by QED to
Atlas with respect to the Project for which QED had been paid (collectively the "Paid
Invoices"). (PA-7, QED 0129-0311.) The Paid Invoices each contained a notation
indicating receipt of a "prior deposit" and the amount of the "prior deposit," which on all
paid invoices demonstrated a payment equal to the amount of the invoice. (PA-7, QED
0129-0311.) Additionally, the last Paid Invoice showed a partial payment from Atlas,
which left a balance owed. (IdL at QED 311.)
The trial court also received a ledger showing Atlas's payments for QED's
invoices on the Project. (PA-9, QED 0124-0128.) The ledger showed the date of
payment and the invoice(s) (by invoice number) to which each payment applied. With
these documents, and the testimony of Dave Dahl ("Dahl"), QED's former branch
manager and others, QED met its burden of proof relating to the validity and amount of
its claim.

ship tickets at trial, and the trial court granted the motion. (Id.; R. 2224:48-50).
7

Hall testified that the terms of Atlas's account generally provided Atlas a
minimum of 30 days and as many as 60 days to pay each invoice, depending on the date
of the invoice. (R. 2221:446-47.) Hall further testified that an invoice issued on October
9, 2001 would be due on November 30, 2001. (Id.) Similar and consistent testimony was
elicited from Dahl regarding the terms of Atlas's account with QED. (R. 2221:316—17.)
The testimony presented in QED's case in chief further indicated that, with two
exceptions, each joint check issued by Comtrol to Atlas for the Project were credited,
dollar-for-dollar, on Atlas's account for the Project. (R. 2133 ^f 49.) The only exceptions
involved a joint check that Atlas never presented to QED and a joint check dated
November 13, 2001, for $85,383.19. Dahl testified that when the $85,383.19 joint check
was tendered, Atlas had a past-due balance with QED relating to the Project in the
amount of $51,123.76. (R. 2221:279-80.) Accordingly, at Atlas's request, QED kept
$51,123.76 from the $85,383.19 joint check, and Atlas retained the balance of
$34,259.43. (R. 2221:279.)
At the time QED and Atlas negotiated the $85,383.19 joint check, Atlas owed
QED at least $85,383.19. (R. 2220:219-20.) However, based on the terms of Atlas's
account with QED, Atlas was not required to pay the entire amount of the $85,383.19.
(R. 2221:279-83.) USF&G argued that QED should have retained the entire amount of
the $85,383.19 joint check and that QED's claims should be offset by $34,259.43 due to
its failure to retain all of that joint check. (R. 2224:30-36.) The trial court agreed with
USF&G and, relying on equitable estoppel, reduced QED's principal damage award by

8

$34,259.43. (R. 2138 113.) Additionally, USF&G challenged QED's claims by referring
to various telephone conversations, written acknowledgments, and conditional and
unconditional lien releases signed by QED (collectively the "Lien Releases"). (R.
2220:214-21; 2222: 632-41.) The trial court found USF&G's reliance on the Lien
Releases misplaced and unreasonable in light of the complexity of the Project and the
volume of electrical equipment supplied by QED for the Project (R. 2225:15-16.)
On October 2, 2006, the trial court entered the Amended Revised Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and the Amended Judgment (the "Judgment") (R. 2124-2165; R.
2159-2162.) The Judgment includes a principal award of $103,052.06, as well as
$81,109.03 in pre-judgment interest. (R. 2160 ^ 2-3.) The Judgment also includes
attorneys' fees in the amount of $120,556.66 and costs of $2,694.99 (R. 2161ffif4-5), for
a total of $307,412.74. (R. 2161 ^ 6.) The trial court awarded attorneys' fees and costs to
QED as the prevailing party but then reduced QED's fees and costs by 25%, which
corresponded to the approximate percentage of QED's recovery reduced by the trial court
based on equitable estoppel. (R. 2138 ^ 18.) The trial court further awarded prejudgment interest at 18% (as provided by the terms of Atlas's account with QED) on the
Judgment. (R. 2138 ^f 16.) The trial court later issued a minute entry ordering that postjudgment interest on the pre-judgment interest and principal award would accrue at 18%
in accordance with the terms of Atlas's account with QED, but that interest on attorneys'
fees and costs award would only accrue interest at the statutory post-judgment interest
rate of 6.37%. (R. 2074-2077; R. 2139 ]f 19.)
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ARGUMENT IN OPPOSITION TO USF&G'S OPENING BRIEF
I.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY
DECLINING TO DISMISS QED'S COMPLAINT.
A.

This Court Should Not Consider USF&G's Arguments with Regard to
Documents It Claim Were Never Produced.

At the outset, this Court should decline to consider any of USF&G's arguments
pertaining to documents USF&G claims QED never produced. USF&G failed to argue to
the trial court that any additional documents had not been produced, as it was required to
do to preserve that issue for appeal and has not proved that additional documents exist.
(R. 627-45; 2224: 42-44); see Duke v. Graham, 2007 UT 31, f 26. This Court "will not
address the merits of an argument that has not been preserved absent either plain error or
exceptional circumstances." Id. ^f 28. And even if either of those two exceptions were
present in this case, USF&G was required to articulate a basis for the application in its
opening brief. See State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, Tf 45, 114 P.3d 551. It has not done so.
Thus, this Court should reject out of hand any argument by USF&G pertaining to
documents it claims QED failed to produce.
B.

The Trial Court Possessed Broad Discretion to Fashion a Rule 37(f)
Sanction, and This Court May Not Augment the Sanction Imposed by the
Trial Court Absent an Abuse of that Discretion.

Once the court makes a "threshold determination" that sanctions are warranted
pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 37(f), "the full range of options for sanctions
under Rule 37 is available, and the trial court has broad discretion to select which
sanction to apply in the circumstances." Hales v. Oldroyd, 2000 UT App 75, f 18, 999
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P.2d 588; Schoney v. Mem'l Estates, Inc., 790 P.2d 584, 585 (Utah Ct App. 1990)
("Management of the actions pending before it is uniquely the business of the trial court
and . . . we accord trial courts considerable latitude in this regard and considerable
deference to their determinations concerning discovery"); see also Tuck v. Godfrey, 1999
UT App 127, Tf 21, 981 P.2d 407 (describing nature of "threshold determination" of
applicability of sanctions). Despite that broad discretion, however, courts "favor, where
possible, a full and complete opportunity for a hearing on the merits of every case." Id.
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 377 P.2d 189, 190 (Utah
1962)); see also W.W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park W. Vill., 568 P.2d 734, 738 (Utah
1977) ("The extreme sanction of default or dismissal must be tempered by the careful
exercise of judicial discretion to assure that its imposition is merited"). It is perhaps for
those reasons that a trial court's discretion to impose sanctions is "more narrow" with
respect to dismissal or entry of default. See Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Osguthorpe, 892
P.2d 4, 8 (Utah 1995). In other words, although a trial court enjoys broad discretion to
sanction litigants appearing before it pursuant to Rule 37(f), only clearly proven and
extreme extenuating circumstances justify dismissing a case.
An appellate court's review of a trial court's choice of sanctions under Rule 37 "is
limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion." Preston &
Chambers, P.C. v. Roller, 943 P.2d 260, 262 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). "Abuse of
discretion" in the context of a Rule 37 motion means that the appellant "must show either
that the sanction is based on an erroneous conclusion of law or that the sanction lacks an

11

evidentiary basis." Wright v. Wright 941 P.2d 646, 650 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). As
demonstrated in the following sections, USF&G has not met its burden to demonstrate
that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to strike QED's complaint.
C.

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Declining to Strike
QED's Complaint.
1.

The Order USF&G appeals arises from a motion the trial court
granted.

On December 2, 2005, USF&G filed its Motion for Sanctions, which was
specifically styled "Motion for Sanctions or, in the Alternative, Motion in Limine." (R.
627-45.) Therein, USF&G "move[d] the Court pursuant to Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure for sanctions against Plaintiff or in the alternative move[d] for an Order
in Limine preventing Plaintiffs use at trial" of the Remittance Documents. (R. 627^5.)
The trial court declined to dismiss QED's complaint, but it sanctioned QED by precluding
QED from relying upon the Remittance Documents at trial. (R. 2224:48-50.)
On appeal, USF&G characterizes the trial court as having "denied [USF&G's]
two[5] motions to dismiss QED's Complaint under Rule 37 and granted the Motions in
Limine, excluding the late produced documents." (Appellant's Br. at 16.) But USF&G

5

On December 14, 2005, USF&G filed a motion styled "Motion in Limine of Defendants
Comtrol, Inc. and USF&G to Exclude Ship Tickets." (R. 1102-1112). As USF&G
concedes in its brief, that motion "did not specifically request the Rule 37 Sanction of
complaint dismissal." (Appellant's Br. at 15). Although USF&G claims to have
requested dismissal during the hearing on its December 14 motion, which was held
simultaneously with the hearing on its December 2 motion, the fact remains that its
December 14 motion did not contain a written request for dismissal. (R. 1102-09.) This
analysis focuses only on USF&G's December 2 Motion for Sanctions because that is the
only one of USF&G's motion that requested dismissal in any manner.
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requested dismissal and document preclusion alternatively and in a single motion, and the
trial court granted USF&G's motion to prevent QED from relying upon the Remittance
Documents at trial. (R. 2224:48-50.) In other words, USF&G obtained the result that it
sought in its motion. As a result, USF&G cannot now argue that the trial court abused its
discretion in granting USF&G's alternative request.
2.

The Trial Court's Decision to Prevent QED From Reiving Upon
the Remittance Documents Rather Than Dismiss QED's
Complaint Contained no Errors of Fact or Law.

USF&G does not marshal evidence or otherwise challenge any of the trial court's
findings of fact regarding its ruling on USF&G's Rule 37 motion. See Chen v. Stewart,
2004 UT 82,1| 19, 100 P.3d 1177 (setting forth marshaling requirement). Nor does
USF&G argue that the trial court misapplied any point of law. Instead, USF&G questions
the trial court's application of its discretion to formulate a sanction to undisputed law and
undisputed facts. Without any argument that a key finding of fact was clearly erroneous
or that a conclusion of law was erroneous, USF&G cannot now argue that the trial court
abused its discretion. See Wright, 941 P.2d at 650 (noting that an appellant "must show
either that the sanction is based on an erroneous conclusion of law or that the sanction
lacks an evidentiary basis").
Even assuming that the proper parameters exist for challenging the trial court's
exercise of discretion, the trial court's exercise of its discretion was perfectly reasonable.
USF&G emphasizes the fact that a number of Utah cases have upheld dismissal as a
sanction for discovery violations allegedly less egregious than those of QED.
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(Appellant's Br. at 38-41.) However, USF&G fails to recognize that in those cases the
trial courts were affirmed not because dismissal was necessarily the most appropriate
sanction, but because "[t]he choice of an appropriate discovery sanction is primarily the
responsibility of the trial judge." See Morton v. Cont'l Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 274
(Utah 1997) (emphasis added) (quoting First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Schamanek, 684
P.2d 1257, 1266 (Utah 1984)); see also kL at 276 ("The court of appeals, in reversing the
trial court, cited several cases which it felt compelled the conclusion that more egregious
behavior was required . . . to sustain [dismissal] . . . . [I]n so holding, the court of appeals
. . . undertook to rewrite rule 37 and ignored prior decisions of this court). None of those
cases compel the same result in this case.
Furthermore, nearly all6 of the cases USF&G cites in support of its abuse of
discretion argument involved aggravating circumstances that are not present in this case.
Those circumstances included substantial delays in the progress of the litigation as a
result of and/or in addition to the discovery violations. See Morton, 938 P.2d at 274-75;
W.W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc., 568 P.2d at 736; Schonev, 790 P.2d at 586; Hales, 2000 UT
App 75, TJ 27; Tuck, 1999 UT App 127,ffl[14, 25. Those circumstances also included the
violation of a court order compelling discovery. See Morton, 938 P.2d at 273, 275;
Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., 2006 UT App 48,fflf7, 10, 129 P.3d 287;
Hales, 2000 UT App 75,fflf3, 19. Also, some of the cases involved a party's failure to
6

The one case cited by USF&G not explicitly detailing any aggravating circumstances is
a short memorandum decision that instead emphasizes "the prior history of [the] case" at
least implying that some aggravating circumstances existed. See Coxey v. Fraternal
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respond to discovery-related motions. See Morton. 938 P.2d at 273; W.W. & W.B.
Gardner. Inc.. 568 P.2d at 736; Hales. 2000 UT App 7, ]f 8. Finally, at least one of those
cases dealt with a party with a very poor chance of prevailing on the merits. See Schoney.
790 P.2d at 586.
In fine, Utah case law—including the very cases USF&G cited—supports the trial
court's exercise of its discretion,
3.

USF&G Has Not Demonstrated That It Suffered Any Prejudice
as a Result of QED's Failure to Timely Produce the Remittance
Documents.

The gravamen of USF&G's claims of prejudice is that QED's delayed production
of the Remittance Documents prevented USF&G from defending against QED's prima
facie case. Specifically, USF&G argues that it was prevented from showing that QED
misallocated payments received from Atlas, (Appellant's Br. at 26-29, 31, 31-32), that
materials were delivered within lien release periods, (Appellant's Br. 29-31), or that
QED's ledger statement was inaccurate, (Appellant's Br. 32-33.) For the following
reasons, however, none of those arguments establish that USF&G was prejudiced in any
way as a result of the timing of production of the Remittance Documents.
First, as noted above, USF&G's December 2, 2005, Motion for Sanctions was very
specific. It requested "sanctions against [QED] or in the alternative . . . an Order in
Limine preventing Plaintiffs use at trial o f the Remittance Documents. (R. 627-45)
(emphasis added). Indeed, despite the fact that USF&G's December 2 alternative motion

Order of the Eagles. Aerie No. 2742, 2005 UT App 185, If 8, 112 P.3d 1244.
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was styled as a motion in limine, it was in fact a Rule 37(f) motion for sanctions against
QED. As noted above, the trial court granted USF&G's alternative motion, concluding
that "under Rule 37 and in terms of a sanction, [those documents] are not usable at a
trial." (R. 2224:50) (emphasis added). In other words, it imposed a sanction against
QED that prevented QED from relying upon the Remittance Documents at trial. The trial
court did not prevent USF&G from relying upon the Remittance Documents at trial. See
Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f) ("If a party fails to disclose a . . . document. .. that party shall not
be permitted to use the . . . document." (emphasis added)). To the extent that USF&G
argues on appeal that it was precluded from relying upon the Remittance Documents,
such an argument is ill founded.
Second, given that USF&G was free to rely upon the Remittance Documents, it
could have sought a continuance of the trial date, thereby obtaining time to review and
incorporate those documents into its anticipated defense against QED's claims. USF&G
could have performed any of the investigation it claims it was precluded from performing
if it had sought and obtained such a continuance. And to the extent it believed that more
documents existed that QED had failed to produce, it could have also filed a motion to
compel production of those documents and sought deposition testimony regarding the
Remittance Documents and QED's document retention policies. USF&G would have
prevailed on such motions and could have avoided the prejudice it claims to have
7

Even if USF&G's motion was to exclude the Remittance Documents for all purposes
and to prevent any party's use of them—which, of course, it was not—that would be even
more damaging to USF&G's claim of prejudice: it cannot argue on appeal that it was
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suffered.

But USF&G, upon QED's production of the Remittance Documents, did not

request a continuance, nor did it seek to compel production of the additional documents
USF&G now argues—for the first time on appeal—exist. USF&G apparently made a
strategic decision to proceed to trial in the hope by excluding the Remittance Documents,
QED would not be able to meet its burden of proof. USF&G cannot now argue on appeal
that any delay on QED's part in producing the Remittance Documents prejudiced USF&G
when USF&G did not so much as request an extension of time within which to
incorporate those documents into its case. And nowhere does USF&G set forth an
argument regarding prejudice sufficient to overcome the fact that it must live with its
strategic decision to proceed to trial.9 USF&G's very arguments imply that the
Remittance Documents were supportive of QED's claims, and not damaging thereto.
Third, even leaving aside the fact that it was USF&G's own actions that prevented
it from assessing and presenting the Remittance Documents at trial, USF&G still cannot
demonstrate that it was prejudiced by any delay in producing the Remittance Documents.
The defenses USF&G argues it was denied the opportunity to explore and assert are not
true affirmative defenses; rather than "raise[] matters extraneous to [QED's] prima facie
case," they merely "negate an element of [QED's] prima facie case." See Keeler Brass

denied access to documents that it explicitly requested to be completely excluded.
8
And, of course, if not well taken, USF&G's failure would have demonstrated that it was
not prejudiced by QED's production of the Remittance Documents.
9
Indeed, USF&G's failure to request an extension or to seek compulsory production of
additional documents may well have caused USF&G to waive, for purposes of appeal,
any argument that QED's untimely production prejudiced USF&G at trial. See Duke,
2007 UT 31, <h 28.
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Co. v. Cont'l Brass Co., 862 F.2d 1063, 1066 (4th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks
and emphasis omitted). Specifically, if asserted, those defenses would bear on whether
QED met its burden to demonstrate the accuracy of its accounting and the sums due and
owing to QED.
In its findings of fact, the trial court found that QED had fully met its burden—
even without the Remittance Documents—to demonstrate proper accounting and
application of payments received, specifically, by presenting evidence demonstrating the
propriety of its accounting measures. (R. 2131-32fflf37-40, 44-45.) In other words,
QED had already proven all of the points that USF&G now contests without the
Remittance Documents. And—more to the point—given the trial court's explicitly stated
confidence in QED's accounting procedures, it is pure speculation that any of USF&G's
proposed investigations would have altered the trial court's findings. (R. 2131 ^f 37.)
Furthermore, USF&G conceded the correctness of those findings of fact by failing to
challenge them on appeal and to marshal evidence as required by law. See Chen v.
Stewart, 2004 UT 82,119, 100 P.3d 1177. Thus, USF&G has effectively admitted that
QED successfully carried its burden at trial. All USF&G can do on appeal is explain how
the Remittance Documents, if presented at trial, would have somehow undermined QED's
ability to meet its burden. Any new evidence that USF&G could present must overcome
the trial court's findings of fact, and the careful balancing of evidence that those findings
reflect.
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Fourth, none of USF&G's other arguments of prejudice carry the day. USF&G
argues that QED's discovery violations denied them the opportunity to determine what
Atlas was doing with USF&G's payments. (See Appellant's Br. at 26.) However,
USF&G did not assert any claims against Atlas, nor did it seek to obtain any of Atlas's
records. As with USF&G's other points, it was within USF&G's power to do so, it made
a strategic decision—with which it now must live—to not do so.
USF&G further claims that it was prejudiced because interest and attorneys' fees
pertaining to QED's claims accrued while QED retained the Remittance Documents.
USF&G claims that prejudice resulted because the lawsuit "may have settled or been
dismissed on dispositive motions had QED timely produced the 11th Hour Documents
and the Withheld Documents." (Appellant's Br. at 34.) Again, USF&G can show no
actual prejudice because QED was the prevailing party in this case and at any rate had no
legal obligation to make or accept an offer of settlement. USF&G's claims that the case
may have been dismissed or settled are purely speculative and fail to demonstrate any
actual prejudice. The same point applies to USF&G's companion argument regarding
attorneys' fees incurred while QED inadvertently retained the Remittance Documents.
USF&G next claims that it was prejudiced in preparing and planning for trial by
relying on QED's representation that it had produced all responsive documents. Again,
however, USF&G could have sought additional time to prepare for trial. Not only did it
not do that, but it never took even a single deposition to determine the existence of
documents either before or after QED's production of the Remittance Documents.
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Similarly, USF&G argues that its examination of the Remittance Documents diverted its
focus from other trial preparation tasks. But yet again, that is a strategic choice made by
USF&G and its counsel, and they must live with the consequences.
Finally, USF&G claims that it was prejudiced by being denied the opportunity to
inspect the boxes from which QED produced the Remittance Documents. However, the
record is devoid of any indication that USF&G requested to inspect these boxes. Thus,
USF&G can show no actual prejudice in this regard.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT QED IS ENTITLED TO
18% PRE-JUDGMENT AND POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST.
A.

QED Is Entitled to 18% Pre-judgment Interest.

The plain language of Utah's payment bond statute entitles QED to 18% prejudgment interest, and this Court need only look to that plain language "and go no further
unless [it] find[s] the language ambiguous." See Cook v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 2002
UT 105, *H 8, 57 P.3d 1084. Utah's payment bond statute requires certain contractors to
deliver
a payment bond satisfactory to the state that is in an amount equal to 100% of
the price specified in the contract and is executed by a surety company
authorized to do business in this state or any other form satisfactory to the
state, which is for the protection of each person supplying labor, service,
equipment, or material for the performance of the work provided for in the
contract.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-504(1 )(b). A copy of Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-504 is included
in the Addenda as Addendum H. According to that language, the statutorily-mandated
amount of the bond is different from the amount a person may recover against the bond.
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Specifically, given certain prerequisites, QED's satisfaction of which is undisputed by
USF&G, "[a] person shall have a right of action on a payment bond under this section for
any unpaid amount due him." See id. § 63-56-504(4) (emphasis added). The statute
imposes no other limitation upon the amount recoverable against a payment bond.
The contract between USF&G and Atlas provides that interest on amounts Atlas
fails to pay to QED accrues at the rate of 18%. (R. 2135 ^ 63.) Thus, not only is the
principal amount "due"—as that word is used in Utah's payment bond statute—to QED,
but interest accruing upon that principal amount at the rate of 18% is due to QED as well.
The relevant language of Utah's payment bond statute—"any unpaid amount due"—is
unambiguous and means exactly what it says. Even if the word "due" is limited to
amounts specified in the Bond agreement itself, QED would still be entitled to 18%
interest on the amounts due to it from Atlas because the Bond does not so much as
mention interest, let alone impose any limitation upon interest to be awarded. See Utah
Code Ann. § 63-56-504. Pursuant to the plain language of Utah's payment bond statute,
QED is entitled to pre-judgment interest at an 18% rate.10
The fact that Utah's payment bond statute allows a person protected by a payment
bond to recover "any unpaid amount due him," without any other limitation upon the

10

This conclusion is not without support. In Trench Shoring Services, Inc. v. Saratoga
Springs Development L.L.C., 2002 UT App 300, 57 P.3d 241, the district court awarded
pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at the rate specified in the contract between the
supplier and the subcontractor. See id. ^| 6. Although this Court declined to consider
arguments that interest at such rate was improper because those arguments were not
preserved for appeal, the fact remains that there is precedent for awarding pre-judgment
and post-judgment interest at a contractual rather than statutory rate. See id. ^f 8 n.2.
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amount recoverable, is of paramount importance. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-504(4).
That fact alone distinguishes this case from the cases from other jurisdictions that
USF&G cites in support of its argument that some other interest rate applies. For
instance, in U.S. Filter Distribution Group, Inc. v. Katspan, Inc., 72 P.3d 1103 (Wash.
App. 2003), the Washington Court of Appeals construed a payment bond statute that did
not explicitly state, in contrast to Utah's statute, that a plaintiff may recover against a
bond "for any unpaid amount due him." See id. at 1108; see also Wash. Rev. Code §
39.08.030. Similarly, inR.W. Sidley. Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co.. 319 F. Supp. 2d. 554
(W.D. Pa. 2004), despite the fact that the bond itself permitted a plaintiff to recover a
"judgment for such sum or sums as may be justly due him," the court held that the
plaintiff was not entitled to interest from a surety. See id. at 558-59 (emphasis omitted).
The court held that the bond's silence on interest demonstrated the parties' intent that the
statutory interest rate govern. Slee id. at 559. Here, however, although the Bond is also
silent regarding interest, Utah's bond statute explicitly entitles QED to "any unpaid
amount." See Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-504. In contrast, Pennsylvania's bond statute
merely requires a bond to be "conditioned for the prompt payment of all. . . material
furnished or labor supplied or performed in the prosecution of the work." Slee 8 Pa. Stat.
Ann. § 193(a)(2). It does not allow a party to recover "any unpaid amount."
The remaining cases USF&G cites fall victim to the same distinction. In Vaughn
Excavating & Constr., Inc. v. P.S. Cook Co., 981 P.2d 485 (Wyo. 1999), the Wyoming
Supreme Court awarded interest at only the statutory rate because the payment bond
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statute restricted claims against a bond to "those things which were clearly contemplated
when the bond was executed." See id. at 488 (internal quotation marks omitted)); see
also Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-6-112. In contrast, because Utah's payment bond statute
explicitly permits a supplier to recover from a bond "any unpaid amount" owed to him,
any amount that may be owed to a supplier—including interest—is "clearly contemplated
when the bond was executed." And the Colorado Court of Appeals' decision in SaBell's,
Inc. v. City of Golden. 832 P.2d 974 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991), applied a payment bond
statute that explicitly limited the amount one could recover against a possession bond to
an "amount not exceeding the sum specified in the bond," and it capped interest at 8%.
See id at 977; see also Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-26-106.n Utah's payment bond statute
contains neither of those limitations.
Even leaving aside the language in Utah's payment bond statute entitling a person
to recover against a bond "any unpaid amount," Utah's bond statute also explicitly states
that a payment bond must "protecty . . . each person supplying labor, service, equipment,
or material for the performance of the work provided for in the contract." Utah Code
Ann. § 63-56-504(l)(b) (emphasis added); see also Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-l(3)(a). The
bond must cover bargained-for interest rates in order to fairly and adequately protect QED
and—most importantly—to comply with the Utah payment bond statute.

11

The other two cases USF&G cites in support of its argument are not payment bond
cases. See Monette v. Tinsley, 975 P.2d 361 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999); Zelda Grain & Supp.
v. Farmland Indus., 894 P.2d 881 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995).
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Indeed, the federal Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. § 270b, which the Utah Supreme Court
has held to be quite similar to Utah's payment bond statute, demonstrates that the purpose
and intent of Utah's payment bond statute require full compensation from the bond for all
interests amounts due and owing. See W. Coatings v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 788 P.2d
503, 505 (Utah 1990) (noting similarities between the Miller Act and Utah's payment
bond statute). The purpose of the Utah statute's federal counterpart is to "shift the
ultimate risk of nonpayment from workmen and suppliers to the surety." See Am. Sur.
Co. of N.Y. v. Hinds, 260 F.2d 366, 368 (10th Cir. 1958). That purpose could not be
fulfilled if suppliers were forced to forego unpaid, but contracted-for, interest on unpaid
amounts from subcontractors; the very purpose of interest is to compensate for delays in
paying amounts due and owing. It is perhaps for that reason that, when determining
whether a successful plaintiff in a Miller Act case is entitled to pre-judgment interest, a
federal court is "free to choose any interest rate which would fairly compensate the
plaintiff for the delay in the receipt of payment." See Towerridge, Inc. v. T.A.Q., Inc.,
111 F.3d 758, 764 (10th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added).12 And it is surely for that reason
that federal courts interpret the Miller Act liberally, in accordance with its remedial
nature, "to protect persons who supply labor and materials." See United States ex rel. B
& D Mech. Contractors v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 70 F.3d 1115, 1117 (10th Cir.
1995).

"[Prejudgment interest awards on Miller Act claims are governed by federal law, not
state law." See Towerridge, 111 F.3d at 764. Thus, the fact that some federal courts end
up applying the state statutory interest rate is irrelevant. See id.
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Relying on the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Wilcox v. Anchor Wate Co.,
2006 UT 67, 564 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, USF&G argues that the application of an 18% prejudgment interest rate is unduly punitive. But Wilcox did not address a claim against a
payment bond. Rather, it addressed an action brought by the liquidator for the Utah
Insurance Department alleging that certain payments made to the defendant constituted
voidable preferences. See id. ^f 1. Thus, it addressed none of the unique and important
considerations surrounding claims against payment bonds, namely, the protection of
suppliers and providers of labor against a subcontractor's failure to pay construction
funds. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-504(l)(b). In any event, USF&G is hard-pressed to
argue that there is anything punitive about an 18% interest rate when that is precisely the
amount that Atlas indisputably owes QED, and the payment bond explicitly allows a
person to recover against a bond "any unpaid amount due him." See id § 63-56-504(4).
B,

QED Is Entitled to 18% Post-judgment Interest.

The same considerations that mandate that QED be allowed to recover prejudgment interest at an 18% rate also mandate that QED be allowed to recover postjudgment interest at that same rate. As noted above, a payment bond must "protect[] .. .
each person supplying labor, service, equipment, or material for the performance of the
work provided for in the contract." Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-504(l)(b); see also Utah
Code Ann. § 14-2-l(3)(a). Moreover, Utah's payment bond statute specifically permits a
person to recover against a bond "any unpaid amount due him." See Utah Code Ann. §
63-56-504(4). Post-judgment interest, as provided for in the contract between QED and
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Atlas, is indisputably an amount that is due to QED as the successful plaintiff. There is
no impediment to QED's recovery of post-judgment interest at the contracted-for interest
rate of 18%.
C.

The Trial Court's Calculation of Interest Did Not Result in Impermissible
Compounding.

Finally, USF&G argues that the trial court's interest award resulted in an
impermissible compounding of interest because it awarded post-judgment interest on prejudgment interest. But this Court has already held that pre-judgment interest and costs are
"included in, rather than treated separate from, a judgment," while post-judgment interest
is "interest which accrues on the judgment, and is therefore separate from the judgment."
See Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'a 945 P.2d 125, 140 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Postjudgment interest "is not a part of a judgment, but is instead added to a judgment at a
specified rate." Id. In other words, a "judgment" is composed of the principal amount
owed, costs, and pre-judgment. Post-judgment interest is simply interest on that
judgment. It is not compounded in the way that USF&G suggests, nor is it prohibited by
Utah law. Under USF&G's reading of the law, any award of both pre- and post-judgment
interest results in allegedly impermissible compounded interest.
The cases USF&G cites in support of its position do not help it. In City of Hilldale
v. Cooke, 2001 UT 56, 28 P.3d 697, the Utah Supreme Court simply held that prejudgment interest should as a general rule be calculated simply. See id. ^ 36. It did not
address whether awarding post-judgment interest and pre-judgment interest is an
impermissible compounding of interest. Similarly, in Watkins & Faber v. Whiteley, 592
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P.2d 613 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court simply stated that "the [trial] court in
calculating the amount of the judgment [improperly] compounded the interest annually
on the unpaid amounts due." See id, at 616 (emphasis added). In other words, the Utah
Supreme Court simply held that the trial court had improperly compounded pre-judgment
interest. It did not hold that the granting of post-judgment interest on a judgment that, in
turn, included pre-judgment interest is improper.
Federal courts have also recognized that awarding post-judgment interest on a
judgment that includes pre-judgment interest does not constitute impermissible
compounding. In FDIC ex rel. Heritage Bank & Trust v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 152 F.3d
1266, 1277 (10th Cir. 1998), the Tenth Circuit ruled "that post-judgment interest. . .
applies to the entire award granted by the district court, including any pre-judgment
interest and costs." Id. at 1277 n.8 (emphasis added). Moreover, in Air Separation, Inc.
v. Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 45 F.3d 288 (9th Cir. 1995), the Ninth Circuit
noted that "[i]t is well-established in other circuits that post-judgment interest also applies
to the pre-judgment interest component of a district court's monetary judgment." Id at
290. In that case, the court concluded that if it were found on remand that the FDIC is
entitled to post-judgment interest on the judgment, that interest would apply to the entire
judgment, including any award of pre-judgment interest and costs. Id. at 291.
Thus, the trial court did not err in awarding QED post-judgment interest on a
Judgment that included pre-judgment interest.
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ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF OED'S CROSS-APPEAL
L

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ESTOPPING QED
FROM CLAIMING $34,259.43 AGAINST THE PAYMENT BOND FOR
MATERIALS FURNISHED TO THE PROJECT.
The trial court applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel to bar QED from

recovering $34,259.43 relating to funds from a joint check QED had allowed Atlas to
keep. (R. 2137 ^ 11-12.) QED allowed Atlas to keep those funds because that amount
was not yet due under Atlas's credit agreement with QED. (R. 2134, ^flj 53-54; R. 2135,
If 61.) Based on its findings of fact, the trial court concluded that QED was estopped as a
matter of law from collecting the $34,259.43 it had allowed Atlas to retain. (R. 2137, ffif
11-12; R. 2138, ^ 13-14.) Findings of fact of a trial court sitting without a jury can only
be reversed if they are "against the clear weight of the evidence" and are thus "clearly
erroneous." Dep't of Human Servs. ex rel. Parker v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 678 (Utah
1997) (quoting McKay v. Hardy, 896 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1995)). A trial court's
conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness. Id. "The issue of whether equitable
estoppel has been proven is a classic mixed question of fact and law." Id Because of the
fact-dependent nature of the determination, a trial court has broad discretion on the issue
of equitable estoppel. Id; see also Dahl v. Hughes, 2004 UT App 391, f 8, 101 P.3d 830
(citing Trolley Square Assocs. v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah Ct App. 1994)).
Because the trial court's findings of fact do not support equitable estoppel, and based on
the remedial nature of Utah's payment bond statute, the trial court abused its discretion in
applying equitable estoppel in this case. The trial court should be reversed because: (1)
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the trial court's equitable estoppel ruling was based on two clearly erroneous findings of
fact, (2) the record is devoid of crucial evidence supporting equitable estoppel, (3) Utah's
payment bond statute strongly favors complete recovery for the value of materials
furnished on public projects, (4) case law demonstrates that the trial court abused its
discretion in applying equitable estoppel to the facts of this case, and (5) additional
considerations unique to this case militate against the trial court's ruling of equitable
estoppel. Each of those points is in and of themselves sufficient to justify reversal of the
trial court's equitable estoppel ruling.
A.

When Properly Marshaled, the Evidence Presented at Trial Does Not
Support the Trial Court's Finding that QED Intended to Give Atlas the
$34,259,43, Nor Its Finding That Atlas Owed That Money to QED.

"In order to challenge a court's factual findings, an appellant must first marshal all
the evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally
insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the
court below." Chen, 2004 UT 82, f 76, 100 P.3d 1177 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The trial court based its equitable estoppel ruling on the following two primary
findings of fact:
•

In exchange for Atlas' payment of $51,123.76 on or about November 19,2001,
which satisfied all amounts owed to QED for the materials and supplies QED
furnished for the Project through September 30, 2001, QED allowed Atlas to
retain the balance of $34,259.43 provided by the November 13, 2001 joint
check. (R. 2134 f 52) (emphasis added).

•

Notwithstanding QED's belief that Atlas did not yet owe the remaining
$34,259.43 of the November 13, 2001 joint check, and that QED, therefore,
could not retain that money, in fact, the total of the Unpaid Invoices on Atlas'
account for the Project (even after applying the $51,123.76 payment) equaled
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at least the remaining balance of the November 13, 2001 joint check—
$34,259.43. (R. 2133 t 54) (emphasis added).
The trial court based those findings on several subsidiary findings. (R. 2133 ^f 41-62.)
At trial, QED and USF&G presented the following evidence in support of those primary
findings:
Unpaid Invoices (PA-6, QED 0001-0059) and Paid Invoices (PA-7, QED
0128-0311), each showing when payment was due; copies of joint checks
(PA-8, QED 1398, QED 0068, QED 0069, QED 0070) and account ledgers
(PA-9, QED 0124-0128; DA-20; DA-21); and statements (PA-9, QED
0060-0062.) (See also R- 2225 at 13-14.)
•

Atlas's agreement with QED and the Unpaid Invoices and Paid Invoices
demonstrate that payment was not due QED until the last day of the month
following the month in which the materials were furnished. (R. 2220:132;
2221:267-282.)

•

Messrs. Dahl, Griffiths and Hall all testified that pursuant to Atlas's
contract with QED, QED could not require payment from Atlas until the
last day of the month following the month in which the materials were
furnished. (R. 2220:28, 132-133; 2221:267, 282, and 316-17.) Messrs.
Dahl, Griffiths and Hall both testified that Atlas's account terms were
industry standard. (R. 2220:29; 2221:282.) (See generally R. 2220:211,
213-214; R. 2221:281-285; R. 2222:475-476; 2225:17.)

•

Messrs. Dahl and Hall both provided testimony to establish that the
payment terms between QED and Atlas involved numerous, repeated
occasions for performance by both parties. (R. 2132 ^f 41.) Moreover,
Messrs. Dahl and Hall testified that both parties had knowledge of the
nature of the prior course of the performance, the opportunity to object to
the arrangement, and that the construction of the agreement and course of
performance were reasonable. (R. 2132 ^f 42.)

•

The payment of joint checks from Comtrol and the corresponding credit to
Atlas' account with QED for the full value of joint checks in the amount of
$25,687.88, $40,297.95, and $9,562.65. (PA-8 at COMPT1398, QED
0068, QED0069 and QED0070; PA-9 at QED0124-QED0128; R. 2220:
86-89.)
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•

Mr. Dahl testified that he had several communications with Comtrol
regarding the status of Atlas's account with QED. (R. 2220:215-16;
2221:254, 256-57.) Additionally, Sharon Zobell of Comtrol testified that
Comtrol had some telephone conversations with QED, but did not do
everything it was contractually entitled to do under its contract with Atlas to
ascertain amounts Atlas owed to QED for materials furnished to the Project.
(R. 2220:199-202, 204 and 213-16.)

•

Rick Griffiths and Mr. Dahl both testified as to QED's accounting methods
and the manner in which QED accounted for materials furnished to Atlas on
the Project and on other projects on which QED was furnishing materials to
Atlas. (R. 2220:164-66; 2221:316-17 and 320-23.) Messrs. Griffiths and
Dahl both testified that QED did not alter documents or fabricate evidence
in support of QED's payment bond claim. (R. 2220:39-40 and 108; R.
2221:350; 2222:476.)
This evidence—which represents all the evidence presented that supports the

findings of fact in question—is insufficient to support the court's finding that Atlas was
due or past due on its account terms with QED for materials furnished to the Project in an
amount equal to or greater than the $34,259.43 portion of the $85,383.19 joint check that
QED intended to waive payment for the balance of the $85,383.19 joint check it allowed
Atlas to retain. First, with respect to the trial court's finding that Atlas owed QED the
$34,259.43, the evidence establishes only that QED had invoiced Atlas for product
supplied by QED for the Project and that Atlas was obligated to pay those invoices in
accordance with the terms of its contract with QED. (R. 2220:219-20.) Furthermore, the
testimony at trial demonstrated that the term "net-30," as used on the Unpaid Invoices,
was understood by Atlas and QED to provide up to sixty days after the issuance of the
invoice for Atlas to make its payments. (R. 2221:446-47; 2222:557.) Thus, at the time
QED invoiced Atlas, that invoice was not past due, and payment was not required for up
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to 60 days, depending on when the invoice was issued. Furthermore, each Unpaid
Invoice contained a payment reminder at the bottom left corner that confirmed the actual
due date of the invoice. (R. 2220:212 and 217; 2221:446^7.) There is simply no
evidence whatsoever that demonstrates that QED had any right to demand payment on the
Unpaid Invoices. The trial court's rejection of the legal impact of the account terms is
against "clear weight of the evidence" and is therefore "clearly erroneous." Irizarry, 945
P.2d at 678.
Second, with respect to the trial court's finding that QED allowed Atlas to keep the
$34,259.43, the only evidence presented at trial by either party demonstrates that QED
was obligated to allow Atlas to retain the portion of the $85,383.19 joint check if Atlas
demanded such. (R. 2221:446-47; 2222:557 and 595.) As demonstrated in the preceding
paragraph, QED did not have any right to retain the portion of the joint check it allowed
Atlas to keep. Given that Atlas's payments were not yet past due, QED was required to
tender to Atlas the full amount of the joint check. Had QED done otherwise, it would
have been in breach of its agreement with Atlas. But that does not mean that QED
intended to permanently relinquish any of its rights to payment by allowing Atlas to retain
a portion of the $85,383.19 joint check. QED did not knowingly or otherwise waive its
right to payment from the Bond of the invoices that would have been paid in part or in
full by the portion of the $85,383.19 joint check QED allowed Atlas to keep. The trial
court's finding to the contrary is against the "clear weight of the evidence" and is "clearly
erroneous." Irizarry, 945 P.2d at 678.
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Thus, because the trial court's finding of equitable estoppel was premised upon
two clearly erroneous findings of fact, it must be reversed. Cf Bolitho v. East 143 P.
584, 588 (Utah 1914) (reversing a trial court's equitable estoppel ruling in part because
"the evidence was not competent to establish an estoppel").
B.

The Record Does Not Support the Trial Court's Equitable Estoppel
Ruling Because Crucial Evidence is Missing From the Record.

Estoppel is an equitable defense that requires proof of three elements: (1) a
statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim later
asserted;13 (2) reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken or not taken on the
basis of the first party's statement;14 and (3) "injury to the second party that would result
from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, act, or
failure to act."15 See CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 970 (Utah
1989); see also Irizarrv, 945 P.2d at 680; DaW, 2004 UT App 391, f 14; Shaw Res. Ltd.,
LLC v. Pruitt Gushee & Bachtell P.C., 2006 UT App 313, % 53, 142 P.3d 560.

The first element must be established with evidence showing some affirmative act or
statement that would demonstrate that a party has done something inconsistent with its
later act. See CECO, 772 P.2d at 970; see also Irizarrv, 945 P.2d at 681 n.2 ("[I]t is not
enough that the person who heard the representations deemed that he was warranted in
acting as he did; the language used ought to itself furnish the warrant"); Myers, C.I.T. v.
Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 759 F.2d 1542, 1548, n.9 (11th Cir. 1985) ("The person against
whom the estoppel is to apply must have actual or constructive knowledge of the facts
and must have induced, through his words or conduct, another to rely upon the purported
representation")
14
To prove the second element, the party asserting estoppel as a defense must show facts
that demonstrate that its reliance was reasonable based on the statements or acts of the
party asserting a claim. See Irizarrv, 945 P.2d at 681.
15
To prove the third element, a party asserting estoppel as a defense must prove actual
detriment resulting from the statement, acts, or inaction of the other party. See Aurora
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Equitable estoppel is typically only applied in cases where there are
misrepresentations of past or present facts. See Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.,
2007 UT 28, Tf 15, 574 Utah Adv. Rep. 32. "[N]o estoppel can arise from an act or a
representation if it was not intended to have the effect claimed." 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel
and Waiver § 46 (2006). On the other side of the coin, "estoppel is not available to
protect a party from the consequences of its own negligence." Syro Steel Co. v. Hubbell
Highway Signs, Inc., 424 S.E.2d 208, 210 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993). "The party seeking to
assert estoppel must have had neither knowledge nor a reasonable means or opportunity
of obtaining knowledge of the facts and must have relied upon the other party's
representations to his detriment." Myers, 759 F.2d at 1548, n.9.
Payment bond cases present additional considerations pertaining to estoppel. In
particular, "courts are hesitant to estop suppliers from recovery under a surety bond
absent a supplier's fraud or negligence." Trane Co. v. Whitehurst-Lassen Constr. Co.,
881 F.2d 996, 1004 (11th Cir. 1989). In fact, "[t]he remedial nature of the [payment bond
statute] requires that a general contractor asserting an estoppel defense do everything it
reasonably can to protect itself. . . ." Id. (emphasis added). In other words, a party
asserting an estoppel defense must have detrimentally relied on the representations
without any reasonable opportunity to ascertain the veracity of the representation. See id.
The evidence in the record does not support the trial court's finding of equitable
estoppel because there is no evidence or finding that: (1) QED misrepresented any facts,

Painting, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 832 F.2d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 1987).
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was negligent in making any representations, or attempted to defraud or deceive Comtrol;
(2) QED was anything but consistent in demanding that it should be paid in full for all
materials furnished to the Project; (3) even if QED represented that the joint check at
issue was equivalent to an amount then owed, but not yet due, QED intended it to be a bar
to its claim against the payment bond; (4) USF&G's reliance on QED's endorsement of
the $85,383.19 joint check was reasonable; or (5) USF&G did everything it could have
done to protect itself. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in applying
equitable estoppel in this case.
First, none of the evidence at trial demonstrates that QED misrepresented any facts
to USF&G. Indeed, the trial court explicitly rejected any notion that QED defrauded or
misrepresented facts in order to recover against the Bond. (R. 2131 f 38; R. 2132 ^ 4 3 45; R. 2225:12-14.) Specifically, the trial court found that "QED did not engage in any
effort to deceive or misrepresent any material fact regarding the electrical materials it
furnished for the Project or to manipulate or deceive with respect to its accounting and
application of payments received with respect to the Project." (R. 2131 ^f 37.)
Furthermore, the Court found, "the weight of the evidence marshaled by QED in support
of its claims was substantial and outweighed the evidence marshaled by [USF&G] to
undermine the accuracy of QED's accounting, the Unpaid Invoices, Ledger and
Statement." (R. 2132-2133 % 45.)
Second, USF&G failed to present any evidence to show that QED made any
representations inconsistent with QED's bond claim for the full amount it was owed for
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materials furnished to the Project. None of the evidence presented at trial demonstrates
that QED agreed to bear the risk of non-payment and thereby waived its bond claim if
Atlas failed to pay QED the $34,259.43. Moreover, none of that evidence establishes that
QED intended to waive its right to collect the $34,259.43 by not demanding payment until
it was past due. In fact, QED presented the evidence at trial to demonstrate that it
adhered to all the statutory requirements in asserting its bond claim. (R. 2220:17; PA-1.)
Moreover, Atlas's credit agreement with QED provides that invoices "shall
become due and payable in lawful money of the United States upon the issuance thereof
unless otherwise specifically agreed to in writing." (PA-4.) However, QED and Atlas
agreed in writing to alter the terms of the credit agreement. (PA-4.) As clearly
demonstrated on the face of the invoices, Atlas and QED agreed to a "net-30"
arrangement—meaning that Atlas was not required to pay QED for each invoice until the
last day of the month following the month during which QED's invoice was issued.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-208 in pertinent part provides as follows:
(1) Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasions for performance by
either party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportunity
for objection to it by the other, any course of performance accepted or
acquiesced in without objection shall be relevant to determine the meaning of
the agreement.
(3) [S]uch course of performance shall be relevant to show a waiver or
modification of any term inconsistent with such course of performance.
The payment terms between QED and Atlas involved numerous, repeated occasions for
performance by both parties. (R. 2132 ^J 41.) Both parties had knowledge of the nature of
the performance, the opportunity to object to the arrangement, and an implicit
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understanding that the construction of the agreement and course of performance were
reasonable. (R. 2132 ^ 42.) All these factors are relevant to the meaning of QED and
Atlas's agreement and undisputedly point to the conclusion that the parties' agreement
required that payment be made on the last date of the month following the month in
which the materials were furnished. (R. 2220:132-133; 2221:267-282.) The trial court
inappropriately faulted QED for adhering to its agreement with Atlas. The catch-22 is
that to avoid the trial court's findings with respect to the $34,259.43, QED would have
had to breach its agreement with Atlas and force Atlas to pay for invoices that were not
yet due. Such a requirement is not equitable.
Third, even if QED represented to USF&G that the $85,383.19 joint check was
equal to an amount owed by Atlas, but not yet past due, there is no evidence in the record
to establish that QED intended endorsement of that check to be a waiver of its right
against the Bond in the event of non-payment by Atlas.16 See 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel
and Waiver § 46 (2006) (requiring intent before applying equitable estoppel as a defense
to a claim). There was no testimony given or evidence admitted to demonstrate that QED
had intended to waive its bond claim for the full amount it was owed for materials
furnished.

In Brimwood Homes, Inc. v. Knudsen Builders Supply Co., the Utah Supreme Court
held that where a construction materials supplier received payments for "more than it was
legally entitled to at that time[,]" a promise to waive its rights to future claims or liens
"would be without consideration." 385 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah 1963). Therefore, even an
inference by QED to waive its rights against the Bond for the full amount of the $
$85,383.19 would be without consideration and unenforceable.
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Fourth, the record does not support an application of equitable estoppel because
the trial court specifically found that USF&G's reliance on lien waivers and statements
made by QED surrounding the joint checks was not reasonable. (R. 2135 ]f 58; R. 2225:
16.) If statements made by QED and lien waivers signed by QED were not a reasonable
basis for reliance, allowing Atlas to keep a portion of a joint check equal to an amount not
yet owed to QED certainly provides no support for the proposition that QED intended to
relinquish its bond claim. Indeed, if the Court could conclude that USF&G could not
reasonably rely on QED's statements and lien waivers, it was certainly an abuse of
discretion for the trial court to then conclude that by virtue of allowing Atlas to keep the
$34,259.43—which was payable but not yet past due—QED should be estopped from
recovering that amount.
Finally, Comtrol could have taken action to ascertain the exact amount Atlas owed
QED, but it did not. (R. 2222:637-41) (demonstrating that despite its contractual right to
do so, Comtrol did not "do everything" it could have reasonably done to protect itself).
For example, Comtrol could have asked QED to explain Atlas's payment terms, but it did
not. In short, Comtrol had the means to acquire knowledge as to the "real facts in
question," but it did not. Syro, 424 S.E.2d at 210. Therefore, if anything, Comtrol was
"negligent" in failing to ascertain the amount owed and the meaning and terms of Atlas's
agreement with QED. Id. (stating that "estoppel is not available to protect a party from
the consequences of its own negligence").
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C.

Utah's Payment Bond Statute Favors Payment in Full for Materials
Furnished to Public Projects.

Because this case involves a payment bond claim, this Court ought to be
particularly cautious in upholding the trial court's application of equitable estoppel to
QED's bond claim. In the private construction arena, those who provide labor and
materials are protected against their contractors' defaults by the availability of mechanic's
liens. See CECO, 772 P.2d at 970. However, the mechanic's lien remedy, and the
protection associated with that remedy, is not available to those who furnish labor and
materials in connection with public construction projects. Id. Therefore, payment bonds
are required on public construction projects to provide substitute protection for laborers
and materials suppliers. Id. "The Utah performance and payment bond statute expressly
reflects this purpose when it states that a 100 percent payment bond shall be executed 'for
the protection of all persons supplying labor and material to the contractor or its
subcontractors for the performance of the work provided for in the contract.'" Id.
The Utah Court of Appeals has emphasized the public policy underlying payment
bonds by stating that the payment bond statute is designed "to protect innocent suppliers"
who are not in privity of contract with the general contractor. Trench Shoring Servs. v.
Saratoga Springs Dev., 2002 UT App 300, ^ 25, 57 P.3d 241 (analyzing Utah Code Ann.
§ 14-2-1 et. seq.). As noted above, Utah's payment bond statute is patterned after the
Miller Act, which provides a basis for subcontractors and suppliers to recover from
payment bonds for labor and materials furnished to public construction projects. See W.
Coatings, 788 P.2d at 505; see also 40 U.S.C. § 270b. The Miller Act is highly remedial
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in nature and should be liberally construed and applied in order to properly protect those
who furnish labor or materials for public construction projects. See United States ex rel.
Balzer Pac. Equip, v. Fid. & Deposit Co., 895 F.2d 546, 551 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Cox
Rock Prods, v. Walker Pipeline Constr., 754 P.2d 672, 673-74 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)
(discussing the "remedial nature" of Utah's mechanic's lien statute). The purpose of the
payment bond provisions of the Miller Act is "to shift the ultimate risk of nonpayment
from suppliers and laborers to the [payment bond] surety." United States ex rel. DOC
Interiors, Inc. v. Dawson Constr. Co., 895 F. Supp. 270 (D. Colo. 1995) (quoting
American Sur. Co. v. Hinds, 260 F.2d 366, 388 (10th Cir. 1958)). In other words,
contracts of compensated sureties "should be liberally interpreted in the interests of the
beneficiaries rather than strictly in favor of the surety." Balboa Ins. Co. v. S. Distribs.
Corp., 710 P.2d 725, 727 (Nev. 1985).17
Thus, the public policy underlying Utah's payment bond statute requires that QED
be paid from the Bond for all materials and supplies QED furnished to the Project along
with interest on all unpaid amounts owed. Applying equitable estoppel in this case would
eviscerate the purpose of the payment bond statute, which is to protect those that furnish
labor and materials for public projects. (R. 2224, 8:11-14.) Accordingly, this Court
should uphold this important public policy by reversing the trial court's application of
equitable estoppel and awarding QED the full amount it is owed for materials furnished
to the Project.

17

See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 624.270.
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The policy underlying Utah's payment bond statute is, in and of itself, a valid
reason for reversing the trial court's equitable estoppel ruling. The trial court's ruling
undermines the purpose of the payment bond statute, exposing QED, a supplier, to the
damaging effects of nonpayment by a subcontractor. As explained in the next section,
that policy informs courts—both Utah's and those of other jurisdictions—to reject the
very estoppel ruling the trial court made in this case.
D.

Case Law Mandates a Reversal of the Trial Court's Application of
Equitable Estoppel as a Bar to a Portion of QED's Bond Claim.

As set forth below, the Utah Supreme Court, the North Carolina Court of Appeals,
and the Fourth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal, among others, have rejected the
application of equitable estoppel as a defense to payment bond claims in situations similar
to this case.
In CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., the Utah Supreme Court reversed a
trial court's application of equitable estoppel as a defense to a payment bond claim. 772
P.2d at 970-71. In CECO, the general contractor working on a school project posted a
"100 percent labor and materials payment bond with the School District, as required by
sections 53-11-1 and 63-56-38 of the Utah Code." IcL at 968. The general contractor
subcontracted the concrete work on the project to Concrete Specialists, Inc. ("CSI"),
which in turn subcontracted a portion of the work to CECO. Id. The general contractor
made periodic payments to CSI as the project progressed. Id. However, CSI failed to pay
CECO. Id, at 969. When CECO inquired of the general contractor regarding payment,
the general contractor offered to issue a joint check to CSI and CECO. Id. at 969.
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Thereafter, the general contractor paid CSI directly and CSI paid CECO on its first
invoice and promised to make additional payments. Id Accordingly, CECO told the
general contractor that it would not be necessary to issue joint checks, that it could pay
CSI, and that CECO would continue to seek payment directly from CSI. Id. Sometime
later, CSI stopped making payments to CECO, ceased working on the project, and filed
bankruptcy. Id, As a result, CECO filed suit to recover under the payment bond. The
trial court held that because CECO refused the general contractor's offer of joint checks,
permitted the general contractor to continue paying CSI directly, and represented that it
would look to CSI for payment, CECO was estopped from asserting a claim against the
payment bond. Id.
In reversing the trial court's decision in CECO, the Utah Supreme Court reiterated
the important public policy underlying bond statutes. Id at 970. The Court stated:
If we were to hold that a subcontractor is estopped from pursuing a bond claim
when it notifies the general contractor that a subcontractor owes it money but
that the sub-subcontractor will continue to look to the subcontractor for
payment, as is the industry custom, the statutory policy of requiring payment
and performance bonds would be seriously undermined. The result would be
to make it rather easy for general contractors to avoid their statutory obligation
to provide assurances that their subcontractors will pay their bills. To find
estoppel in this situation produces a ludicrous result: a sub-subcontractor who
makes the general contractor aware of possible payment problems with a
subcontractor, but still looks to that immediate subcontractor for payment,
cannot collect against the bond; whereas a sub-subcontractor with payment
problems who says nothing can proceed against the bond.
Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court.
Similar to the plaintiffs in CECO, QED was working on a public project for a local
school district and was not paid for the all the materials furnished to the Project. QED
42

attempted to work with its customer, Atlas—who was in privity of contract with the
general contractor—to procure payment for its materials furnished to the Project. In
doing so, QED communicated directly with USF&G regarding the amounts it was owed
for materials furnished. When Atlas failed to pay QED in full, QED asserted a
statutorily-authorized claim against the Bond, which was posted to guarantee payment for
all those furnishing labor and materials to the Project. And, as in CECO, applying
equitable estoppel in this case would produce a "ludicrous result", a supplier who works
with its subcontractor and honors the terms of its agreement would be barred from
recovering against a bond. Id,
Additionally, other jurisdictions that have addressed the application of equitable
estoppel in payment bond cases similar to this one have also rejected its application. For
example, in Syro Steel Co. v. Hubbell Highway Signs, Inc., the North Carolina Court of
Appeals concluded that because the general contractor had the means to acquire
knowledge as to the "real facts in question," equitable estoppel was not an appropriate
defense to the supplier's bond claim. 424 S.E.2d at 210-11. Moreover, the North
Carolina Court of Appeals was particularly hesitant to allow an estoppel defense because
the general contractor knew that its obligations under the payment bond would be invoked
if the supplier were not paid for the materials furnished. Id.
Here, as in Syro, USF&G should not be allowed to hide behind an estoppel
defense when Comtrol knew, or should have known, that if QED was not paid in full for
all materials furnished to the project, the surety's payment obligation "would be invoked."
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Id. This is particularly true when the record is bereft of any evidence to establish that
QED represented that it would not assert a claim against the bond if Atlas failed to pay
the remaining amount owed. See CECO, 772 P.2d at 970 (concluding that estoppel was
inappropriate because the supplier never expressly waived its rights against the bond).
In Clark-Fontana Paint Co. v. Glassman Constr. Co., 397 F.2d 8 (4th Cir. 1968),
the Fourth Circuit reversed a trial court's decision denying a supplier's recovery on the
basis of equitable estoppel. The issue in Glassman was whether a supplier of materials,
who had not been paid, could recover under the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. § 270b, the balance
due when it had received and endorsed joint checks from the general contractor that were
sufficient to cover the balance owed. Id. at 9. The general contractor issued nine joint
checks to the subcontractor and supplier. Id. The reverse side of each check displayed a
waiver whereby the parties, by endorsing the checks, were ostensibly waiving their rights
to further payment. Id The waiver stated:
THE UNDERSIGNED ENDORSERS, IN CONSIDERATION OF THE
ISSUANCE OF THIS CHECK, DO HEREBY WAIVE AND RELEASE
TO THE EXTENT OF THE FULL FACE VALUE HEREOF ANY RIGHT
ANY OF THEM MAY HAVE TO CLAIM A MECHANIC'S OR
MATERIALMEN'S LIEN OR TO ASSERT ANY CLAIM UNDER ANY
BOND GIVEN BY THE PAYER HEREOF AS PRINCIPAL, FOR ANY
WORK DONE FOR OR MATERIALS FURNISHED TO THE PAYER
HEREOF OR ANY OTHER PAYEE OR PAYEES NAMED HEREIN IN
OR ABOUT THE CONSTRUCTION, REPAIR OR IMPROVEMENT OF
THE JOB DESIGNATED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF.
USF&G's position, if taken to its logical extreme, would encourage all bond sureties
and their indemnitors/guarantors to issue all payments to subcontractors in the form of a
joint check. As a practical matter, issuing a joint check in cases like this should not be a
way to avoid valid payment bond claims. To do so would cause those supplying labor
and materials to public projects to unwittingly waive their bond claims.
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In Glassman, the supplier allowed the subcontractor to deposit seven of the nine
joint checks because the subcontractor was having trouble making payroll. Specifically,
the suppliers allowed the subcontractors to keep most of the proceeds from those checks.
Id at 10. The district court found that if the supplier had deducted the amount currently
due from each check it allowed the subcontractor to keep, it would have been paid in full.
Id. The general contractor and surety argued that the supplier waived its right to assert
claims for non-payment or, alternatively, was estopped from claiming the amount owed.
Id. The Fourth Circuit rejected the waiver argument, holding that despite the waiver
language on each of the joint checks, the waiver was not clear and explicit enough to
constitute a waiver of the supplier's right against the bond. Id. Moreover, the Fourth
Circuit reversed the trial court because there was no showing that the supplier misled the
general contractor to its detriment, and estoppel was therefore not a valid defense to the
supplier's bond claim; the Fourth Circuit therefore reversed the trial court's judgment. Id.
at 11.
Glassman is persuasive in this case because here the trial court specifically found
that USF&G's reliance on the waivers and statements made by QED was not reasonable.
(R. 2135 ^f 58.) As in Glassman, this case deals specifically with joint checks. The only
real difference between this case and Glassman is that in Glassman the joint checks
included conspicuous waiver language and the supplier in Glassman allowed the
subcontractor to keep 7 of 9 joint checks. Despite those facts (which are not present
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here), the Fourth Circuit concluded that waiver and estoppel were not appropriate
defenses to the claim. Here, QED only permitted Atlas to retain a portion of one joint
check. That joint check did not include any waiver language and the amount QED
allowed Atlas to keep was not then due to QED. (R. 2133 ^J 53.)
Finally, in Krupp Steel Prods., Inc. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 831 F.2d 978 (11th Cir.
1987), a supplier filed suit under the Miller Act for non-payment of materials furnished to
a project. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of the general contractor and surety. Id. at 984. In doing so, the Court reiterated the
remedial nature of the Miller Act and the fact that its terms should be "liberally
construed." Id. at 980. The Court noted as follows:
We emphasize that a finding of estoppel would place the burden on [the
supplier] in contravention of the Miller Act's stated purpose and despite any
reasonable reliance [the supplier] might have placed on Miller Act protection.
In effect, such a decision would make [the supplier] responsible for monitoring
its purchaser, rather than making [the general contractor] responsible for
monitoring its subcontractor. This goes against the wisdom behind the Miller
Act that, by virtue of being able to choose subcontractors, a general contractor
qua surety should be responsible for any nonpayment. Thus, a finding of
estoppel should not come lightly.
Id. at 983 n.3 (emphasis added); see also Trane Co., 881 F.2d at 1001 (considering the
"highly remedial nature" of the payment bond statute and the fact that the statute should
be "liberally construed to effectuate its purpose of ensuring suppliers receive full
compensation for the labor or materials they provide to public work projects" in rejecting
equitable estoppel as a defense to a supplier's bond claim).

46

II.

IF THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ESTOPPING
QED FROM CLAIMING $34,259.43 AGAINST THE PAYMENT BOND, IT
ALSO ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY REDUCING QED'S ATTORNEYS'
FEES AWARD BY 25%.
A trial court's calculation of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs is reviewed for

an abuse of discretion, and its discretion to award fees and costs it deems reasonable is
reviewed de novo. See Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 991. As a general rule, a prevailing
party may recover attorneys' fees "if an applicable statute or contract so provides." A.K.
& R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Guy, 2004 UT 47, % 7, 94 P.3d 270. Courts use a
"flexible and reasoned approach to decide[e] in particular cases who actually is the
'prevailing party.'" Mountain States Broad. Co. v. Neale, 776 P.2d 643, 649 n.7 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989) (emphasis omitted). In calculating a prevailing party's reasonable fees,
trial courts consider a number of factors, see Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985,
989-90 (Utah 1988), but must consider "at least some established touchstones" and
"document in findings of fact the factors it considers." Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 57
(Utah 1998); see also Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 988 (noting that "an award of
attorney fees must be supported by evidence in the record"). Finally, the "[calculation of
reasonable attorney fees is in the sound discretion of the trial court." Dixie State Bank,
764 P.2d at 988. "However, once the trial court makes that determination in the exercise
of its sound discretion, it commits legal error if it awards less than the reasonable fee to
which the successful litigant is entitled." Id. at 991.
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In this case, the trial court awarded fees based on Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-38(6),
which provides for reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in an action on a
payment bond. (R. 2138 ^j 18.) QED submitted the appropriate affidavit and
documentation for the court to consider, and on April 12, 2006, the trial court made
findings that QED's requested fees were "appropriate." (R. 1647.) After further briefing
on the matter, the trial court reduced QED's requested fees and costs by 25% "because
QED is only entitled to 75% or 3A of the principal amount it was seeking at trial." (R.
2138-39 ^f 18.) Therefore, because the trial court abused its discretion by estopping QED
from claiming $34,259.43, its reduction of QED's fees and costs has no support in the
record and constitutes legal error. See Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 988, 991. This Court
should remand the trial court's calculation of attorneys' fees and instruct it to award QED
all of the fees and costs that the trial court previously determined were reasonable.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY APPLYING THE STATUTORY POSTJUDGMENT INTEREST RATE OF 6.37% TO THE ATTORNEYS' FEES
AND COSTS PORTION OF THE AMENDED JUDGMENT.
A trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness. See Spears, 2002

UT 24, If 12. Utah's payment bond statute provides that "[a] person shall have a right of
action on a payment bond under this section for any unpaid amount due him." Utah Code
Ann. § 63-56-504(4) (emphasis added). As stated previously herein, the relevant
language of Utah's payment bond statute—"any unpaid amount due"—is unambiguous
and means exactly what it says. In the present case, the contract on which this action is
19

Section 63-56-38, which was controlling at the time QED claimed against the payment
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based explicitly provides for costs of collection and attorneys' fees. (PA-4.) The same
contract also provides for an 18% interest rate. (PA-4.) The trial court's Minute Entry
reducing the post-judgment interest rate on the attorneys' fees portion of the award to the
statutory rate of 6.37% did so on the basis that the attorneys' fees were awarded pursuant
to Section 63-56-38 of the Utah Code. (R. 1904-1905.) However, because Utah's
payment bond statute explicitly and unambiguously provides for the recovery by a bond
claimant of "any unpaid amount due" and because under QED's contract with Atlas it is
entitled to 18% interest, the trial court erred in only awarding QED post-judgment interest
at the statutory rate of 6.37% instead of the contractual rate of 18%. (PA-4.) The
relevant statute unambiguously provides that a judgment not merely a principal amount
due, "shall bear the interest agreed upon by the parties." Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4
(emphasis added). The language of Utah's payment bond statute mandates that this Court
award post-judgment interest at a rate of 18% on the entire amount of the judgment.
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm QED's Amended Judgment against USF&G in the
amount of $307,412.74, but it should reverse the trial court's application of equitable
estoppel. Specifically, this Court should conclude that: (1) the trial court abused its
discretion by applying equitable estoppel principles to this case, (2) erred by reducing
QED's attorneys' fees award, and (3) erred by not awarding QED 18% pre-judgment and
post-judgment interest on the full amount of QED's Judgment against USF&G.

bond, was renumbered in 2005 as § 63-56-504(6).
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Accordingly, the Court should award QED an additional $34,259.43, along with all its
attorneys' fees in prosecuting this matter, including attorneys' fees and costs incurred on
appeal, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-504(6), and prejudgment and post-judgment
interest at the rate of 18% per annum.
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ADDENDUM
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(l 1), the addendum is filed separately to avoid making this
brief unreasonably thick.
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